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Abstract
This paper reviews the obstacles for an appropriate financial architecture of new
economy firms in developing countries by reviewing the theoretical and some
preliminary empirical underpinnings of the importance of legal and institutional
barriers. Apart from the more conventional institutional and legal barriers, which are
advanced by the recent law and finance literature, the analysis in this paper focuses on
the importance of the ICT environment, as a potentially important barrier to the
development of the business sector in general, and new economy firms in particular.
This preliminary analysis confirms the importance of this ICT environment for asset
allocation (and the creation of intangibles) for the financial structure and, ultimately, for
firm growth.
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1 Introduction
This paper addresses some important aspects of the financial architecture of new economy
firms in developing countries and analyses which legal and institutional barriers exist for its
financial architecture to be optimal.  The concept of ‘financial architecture’ was first
introduced by Myers (1999: 138), according to whom the term refers to ‘the entire financial
design of the business, including ownership, the legal form of organization, incentives,
financing and allocation of risk’. As such, the term incorporates, among others, issues of
capital structure, corporate control and corporate governance.  Myers states that most of
corporate finance theory and practice has developed with a particular financial architecture in
mind, i.e. that of a public corporation in a country like the USA or UK with well-developed
security markets, but that (even in those countries) there are other distinct financial
architectures present and successful. He points out that financial architectures that depend on
active and risk-tolerant capital markets, in turn depend on adequate information such as
financial reporting, basic protection for investors, enforceability of contracts, and law and
regulation in general (Myers 1999: 139).
In this paper, we extend the model of Cassimon and Engelen (2001), who analyse the optimal
financial architecture for the so-called ‘new economy’ firms in high-income OECD countries,
to developing countries. They suggest that new economy firms need a distinct and different
optimal capital structure and corporate control or corporate governance mechanisms
compared to more traditional firms. In their analysis, they focus on a major type of new
economy firms, namely the (relatively) small, start-up firms with considerable real option
characteristics embedded in their operations, and with a high degree of co-investment of
human and financial capital. It is shown that optimal financial architecture typically includes
mechanisms with in-built option characteristics, such as the use of near-equity financing
instruments (convertible bonds, or bonds-cum-warrants, which are all debt financing vehicles
with in-built financial options) and the use of stock options. When analysing new economy
firms, it is clear that they are characterized by their growth opportunities as embedded in their
real options. It can be expected that the optimal financial architecture for new economy firms
is, in principle, not different for developing countries. This paper focuses on the existence of
weak legal framework and state of financial development and high uncertainty as barriers for
new economy firms to move to their optimal financial architecture.
2 Characteristics of new economy firms in developing countries
It is clear that there exists no exact definition of a typical new economy firm. The term is
used to refer to a wide variety of firms that are active in a high-tech sector (ICT,
biotechnology) and exhibit characteristics such as a high level of real option projects, a high
burnrate, etc. In this paper we mainly focus on new economy firms from the ICT sector.
While the development of new information and communications technologies (ICT) is well
documented in developed countries, its diffusion in developing countries is not yet well
researched. This section gives an overview of the ICT infrastructure, the diffusion of personal
computers, internet and mobile telephones in developing countries.
Table 2 gives an overview of the worldwide ICT environment. It gives an indication of the
worldwide telecom and internet development level. Traditional measures for the development
of the telecom sector in a country are the number of fixed telephone subscribers and the
number of mobile phones per 1000 people. As can be seen this figure ranges from just 412
(low-income countries) to 548 (high-income countries) for fixed telephones and from 12
(low-income countries) to 592 (high-income countries) for mobile phones (see panel II of
Figure 2). This means that the fixed lines density in low-income countries is only 7 per cent
of the density in high-income countries, while the mobile phones density in low-income
countries is even lower (2 per cent of high-income density). The number of fixed lines varies
from only 2 per 1000 people in Cambodia to 700 per 1000 people in the US (see Table 3),
while the number of mobile phones varies from 1 per 1000 people in Bangladesh to 737 per
1000 people in Italy. A mobile telephone network is not yet active countries such as Ethiopia
and Nigeria. Interesting, however, is the fact that developing countries lacking the
infrastructure of fixed lines, skip the expansion of the fixed lines infrastructure and directly
move to the development of mobile telephone networks. Although the ratio of mobiles versus
fixed lines is the highest for high-income countries (e.g., the ratio amounts 1.55 in Italy or
1.23 in the UK), especially African countries exhibit more mobile than fixed telephone
subscribers (e.g., the ratio is equal to 1.67 in Cameroon and Côte d’Ivoire and 2.67 in
Uganda). Figure 1 gives an overview of the relationship between the fixed telephone density
and the mobile density.
Besides the telecom environment, the level of development of  internet and computer
availability is also of crucial importance for new economy firms. Good measures for this
development are the number of personal computers and the number of internet users per 1000
people. Although the numbers of  internet users is estimated to be around 315 million (ITU
2002), there is a huge digital gap between developed and developing countries. While almost
a third of the population in developed countries are online (see column [e] in Table 2), this
figure shrinks to less than 9 per cent for upper middle-income countries, less than 3 per cent
for lower middle-income countries and only 0.4 per cent for low-income countries. While
Nordic countries have the highest level of internet penetration (e.g. 45 per cent penetration in
Sweden), it is non-existing in Ethiopia and virtually non-existing in countries like Cambodia,
Bangladesh, Haiti or Albania (see Table 3). When looking at the level of development of the
highly-skilled IT job market and the legal environment of ICT necessary for the development
of new economy businesses, again, a huge digital gap exists between developed and
developing countries. While the index of the highly-skilled IT job market is about 6 for high-
income countries, it is less than 4 for low-income and lower middle-income countries (see
column [f] in Table 2). It ranges from 2.2 in Romania to 6.7 in the US.1 The same goes for
the legal environment (see column [g] in Table 2).
The gap between developed and developing countries with respect to the ICT environment
becomes even more clear when we compare, for instance, Columbia to Sweden. While the
number of mobile phones totals over 700 per 1000 in Sweden and is even higher than the
number of fixed telephones (682 per 1000), the number in Colombia is only 53 and 169
respectively. The same goes for the number of PCs and internet users: 507 and 455 per 1000
people in Sweden versus 35 and 21 per 1000 people in Colombia. Moreover, in Sweden
about 62 PCs are installed in education, whereas this number decreases to 3 in Colombia. It is
therefore not surprising to see that the index referring to the level of skilled IT job market is
6.1 in Sweden compared to only 3.3 in Colombia. Several other indicators confirm this
picture: internet speed and access (6.4 versus 3.8), internet effects on business (4.0 compared
to 3.2), competition in ISPs (6.6 versus 4.7) and laws relating to ICT use (5.7 compared to
                                                
1 Note however that this index is not available for several African countries.3
3.8).2 Again, looking at ICT expenditures, similar conclusions can be drawn. While Sweden
invests about US$ 24,874 million in ICT (or US$ 2,804 per capita), Colombia only invests
US$ 10,434 million (or US$ 231 per capita).
3 Law and finance
The importance of the institutional and legal environment for the development of these
markets and economic growth only recently attracted attention of research in corporate
finance, in particular in the so-called law and finance literature. This new research area was
initiated by the seminal papers of La Porta et al. (1997, 1998). These papers focused on
investigating the relationship between a country’s legal framework and its financial
development. Their analyses focus on company laws and bankruptcy/reorganization laws.
In their first paper, La Porta et al. (1998) examine whether laws on investor protection differ
across countries and whether these differences matter for corporate finance. Investors’ rights,
in La Porta et al. (1998), are both shareholder rights as well as creditor rights. The different
bundles of rights to which an investor is entitled are determined by laws and are not inherent
in the securities themselves, implying that legal rules matter. In line with comparative legal
scholars, La Porta et al. (1998) classify the national legal systems of 49 countries into four
families of law.3 Their results show that investor protection is determined by the legal family
to which a country belongs.
In a follow-up paper La Porta et al. (1997) show that the legal environment is highly relevant
for the size and extent of a country’s capital markets. An investor is only willing to surrender
funds to a company in exchange for securities, if he is protected against expropriation by
management. A good legal environment, as measured by both legal rules and the quality of
enforcement, therefore expands the ability of companies to raise external finance through
either debt or equity. Using three equity measures (ratio of stock market capitalization to
GNP, the number of listed domestic companies and the number of initial public offerings)
their regression results show that low shareholder protection causes smaller equity markets as
well as lower access of firms to external equity. Similar results are found with regard to the
debt market. Using two different indicators,4 their results show that debt finance is more
accessible in common law than in French civil law countries. To conclude, La Porta et al.
(1997) offer strong evidence that the legal framework has a large effect on the size and the
breath of capital markets across countries. Other papers finding similar relations between the
legal framework and financial development include Carlin and Mayer (1999) and Demirgüç-
Kunt and Maksimovic (1998).
                                                
2 Ratings from 1 to 7 (highest is best) for Sweden and Colombia respectively, for the year 2000. Based on data
provided by World Bank and ITU.
3  Historically speaking, common law is case law developed by precedents from judicial decisions. Common
law countries include the UK, the United States, Canada and British colonies. Civil law countries, on the
contrary, are characterized by the codification of abstract rules and rely heavily on legal scholars. Civil law
countries can be divided into three families: French (a.o. France, Belgium, Spain, Portugal and several Latin
American countries), German (a.o. Germany, Austria, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Italy and Switzerland) and
Scandinavian.
4 The total bank debt of the private sector and the total face value of corporate bonds, both relative to GNP.4
Examining the impact of property rights and the enforcement of these laws using a sample of
39 countries, Claessens and Laeven (2001) extend the existing law and finance literature.
Their empirical results not only show that weaker legal frameworks diminish the availability
of external resources, but also show an asset-substitution effect, i.e. the investment in more
fixed assets relative to intangible assets compared to firms operating in a strong legal
environment, because of weaker (intellectual) property rights. This is of crucial importance
for new economy firms because such firms depend heavily on the investment in intangible
assets. An over-allocation of resources towards tangible assets will then impede future
growth opportunities of such firms. Especially for new economy firms the asset substitution
will be as important as the finance effect of a weak legal framework. Their overall results
show that weaker property rights are associated with lower firm growth because of these two
effects: less financing and underinvestment in intangible assets. Again, this paper adds to the
growing amount of evidence provided by the law and finance literature that the legal
framework matters and that it is of crucial importance for explaining financial behavior of
companies and investors.
The finding of the law and finance literature that the legal environment is a crucial factor
contributing to the development of financial markets, is important because recent research
shows a clear link between the development of financial markets and economic growth.
Several recent empirical studies find a link between financial development and economic
growth. King and Levine (1993) find a relationship between indicators of financial
development and indicators of economic growth. The empirical results in Levine and Zervos
(1998) show a statistically significant relationship between initial stock market development
and subsequent economic growth. Similar results are reported by Rousseau and Wachtel
(1998) and Van Nieuwerburgh and Buelens (2000). Financial development can enhance
subsequent economic growth in several ways (Levine 1997 and Beck, Levine and Loayza
2000): enhanced savings, capital accumulation, efficiency improvements and technological
innovation. The link between legal framework and economic growth is clear: investor
protection enhances financial development, which in turn accelerates economic growth (see
Figure 2). So, from a development point of view, the legal framework is an important element
for creating economic growth. A seminal recent analysis of this direct link between financial
development, financing structures, legal framework and firm growth is presented in the work
of Rajan and Zingales (1998).
4 Legal and institutional barriers in developing countries
The previous section demonstrated that the law and finance literature, combined with the
finance-growth literature, convincingly shows that the legal framework is an important
precondition for the development of financial markets and the creation of economic growth.
This section examines whether developing countries are characterized by a weaker legal
framework, weaker law enforcement and poorer property rights. To the extent that such
poorer legal and institutional framework leads to an impediment of growth opportunities or
real options of firms, this will lead to less economic growth at the aggregate level of
developing countries. This will especially be the case for new economy firms that depend
heavily on the existence of capital markets, investment in intangible assets and so on. If the
legal framework in developing countries is inadequate for the optimal financial architecture
of such firms, the digital gap between developed and developing countries will widen further.
Figure 2 shows the impact of three elements of the legal framework on the financial
architecture of new economy firms and hence on economic growth: (i) sufficient financial5
resources, (ii) adequate protection of intellectual property and (iii) adequate ICT laws
enhancing the institutional and technological framework for new economy firms. First, as
Cassimon and Engelen (2001) show the existence of new economy firms depends on
adequate financing possibilities. Given the high burnrate and the presence of many real
growth options, the adequate financing of such firms occurs through the use of near-equity
instruments such as (naked) warrants or convertible debt or through sequential financing by
business angels and venture capitalists (Cassimon and Engelen 2002). The availability of
these financial instruments and the supply of venture capital depend on the existence of well-
developed capital markets. Myers (1999) points out that venture capital markets will only
work if there a stock market exists that accepts initial public offerings (IPOs) by young high-
tech companies. The existence of a stock market for growth companies such as NASDAQ
offers venture capitalists the possibility of an exit from these firms at the time of the IPO
(Black and Gilson 1998). Moreover, also entrepreneurs, who commit their entire (human)
capital in a start-up company, will only do so ex-ante if they can share in the ex-post profits
through an exit on a stock exchange (Myers 1999). Technological innovation and growth,
therefore, depend on the development of financial markets, which in itself depends on the
legal framework.
Second, the development of new economy depends heavily on the investment in intangible
assets. To the extent that intellectual property rights are not well protected, Claessens and
Laeven (2001) document an asset-substitution effect, which implies that in countries with a
weak legal framework on intellectual property, an over-allocation of resources towards
tangible assets occurs. Because the growth of new economy firms depends heavily on real
growth options, this  asset-substitution will impede the development of such firms.
Finally, the development of new economy firms also depends on the quality of ICT laws
creating an adequate technological and institutional framework for these firms. It concerns
laws relating to electronic commerce, digital signatures and consumer protection.
Table 4 gives an overview of several legal and institutional constraints which can impede the
growth of new economy firms in developing countries. The data presented here are mainly
the results of firm-level surveys, i.e. the  World Business Environment Survey (WBES)
conducted by the World Bank for 80 countries. First, columns [a] to [d] represent four
barriers to the optimal amount of investment in intangible assets. The first variable measures
the protection of intellectual property and analyses whether or note copyrights, patents and
trademarks are violated by competitors. It appears that the protection of these intellectual
property rights is indeed more problematic in developing countries (2.28, 2.61 and 2.44) than
in high-income countries (1.90) (see column [a] of panel II of Table 4). Remarkably, the
protection of these rights is less problematic in the lowest income countries. If banks and
financial institutions demand collateral for providing financing, again, financing for new
economy firms is problematic because of the intangible nature of such firms. As Table 4
shows the provision of collateral becomes increasingly problematic for developing countries
(ranging from 2.50 to 2.63, compared to 2.13 for high-income countries). As new economy
firms invest heavily in intangible assets, adequate financial reporting becomes increasingly
important to value investments in goodwill and other intangible assets. As can be seen from
columns [c] and [d] of Table 4, the quality of accounting standards decreases sharply with the
level of income of a country, which can further impede the development of new economy
firms in developing countries because shareholders and financial institutions face higher
uncertainty about the fundamental value of such firms.6
Next, Table 4 analyses whether the level of corruption is more of a problem in obtaining
sufficient financial resources in the developing countries. Columns [e] and [n] measure the
level of corruption of bank officials and the general level of corruption of a given country. As
can be seen, corruption is becoming increasingly problematic in developing countries
(ranging from 2.36 for upper middle-income countries to 2.89 for low-income countries,
compared to only 1.60 for high-income countries)5.
Besides the mere existence of legal rules, La Porta  et al.  (1997, 1998) show that the
enforcement of such rules is of equal importance. Therefore, variables [g] through [l] of
Table 4 examine the enforcement of legal rules in developing countries. Table 4 reports the
general quality of courts, the fairness and impartiality of courts, the honesty and
non-corruptiveness of courts, consistency of the court’s decisions, enforcement of the court’s
rulings and the confidence in the legal system for upholding one’s rights. This legal
constraints can be summarized in column [n] which measures how problematic is the
functioning of the judiciary for the operation and growth of one’s business. This general legal
constraint is again higher for developing countries (ranging from 2.13 to 2.26 for developing
countries compared to only 1.79 for developed countries).
Finally, column [o] of Table 4 reports the impact of the ICT laws relating to electronic
commerce, digital signatures and consumer protection. It shows that ICT laws are well-
developed and enforced in high-income countries (5.12) compared to low-income countries
(2.91). Again, these results suggest that e-commerce is less well protected in developing
countries which, on top of the financing and asset allocation constraints, impedes the
development of new economy firms (see Figure 2). Figures 3 and 4 give a graphical
representation of the relationship between legal and institutional barriers and the ICT
environment and asset allocation.
5 Empirical analysis of legal barriers for new economy firms
This section provides some preliminary empirical tests of the issues discussed so far, using
firm-level data, as drawn predominantly from former research discussed in the previous
sections.
5.1 Hypotheses
As outlined earlier, the general discussion of the previous sections focused on three main
channels: lack of adequate protection of intellectual property depressing the creation of
intangible assets, lack of well-developed financial markets to provide adequate and sufficient
financing, and lack of adequate ICT laws that would enhance the overall institutional and
technological framework for these new economy firms. This section presents empirical tests
for each of these three channels in order to assess the importance of the (absence of an
appropriate) legal and institutional framework as potential barriers to the development of a
new economy sector in developing countries.
                                                
5 Table 5 reports the numbers for individual countries.7
5.1.1 The impact of constraints on the investment in intangible assets
First, we analyse to what extent the use of intangibles (expressed as the share in total assets)
is influenced by both general and New Economy-type specific legal and institutional barriers.
Four different types of legal barriers are taken into account and their effect analysed
separately: (i) the efficacy of the overall judiciary system, (ii) the efficacy of ICT laws,
(iii) the collateral requirements demanded by banks and financial institutions, and (iv) the
level of corruption. Furthermore, variables are added to account for the specific position of
the ICT sector with respect to the use of intangibles and to account for firm size. The ICT
sector-specific effect of these different barriers is analysed separately by multiplying the
barrier variable with the ICT secor dummy variable. Country dummies are included. The
estimated equation is the following:
Intangible assets/total assets = a + b1 ICT (or alternatively barrieri*ICT) + b2 Judiciary
system (or alternatively Collateral, ICT Laws, Corruption) + b3 Size + b4,n Country
dummies + e.
ICT-sector ICT is a dummy variable that takes the value 1 if the firm is from the ICT sector
and zero if not (based on a two-digit industry code).  Judiciary is an indicator of the
functioning of the judiciary and ranges from 1 to 4 (lowest is best), ICT laws is an indication
of the efficacy of laws relating to electronic commerce, digital signatures and consumer
protection and ranges from 1 to 7 (highest is best), corruption is an indication of the
corruption of bank officials and ranges from 1 to 4 (lowest is best), and collateral is an
indication of the collateral requirements demanded by banks and financial institutions and
ranges from 1 to 4 (lowest is best). Size is the logarithm of total assets.
5.1.2 The impact of constraints on the availability and use of long-term and short-term debt
Next, we analyse to what extent financial structure is influenced by these legal indicators.
Two different indicators are used separately to proxy for financial structure and check for
robustness of the results obtained. The first is the ratio of long-term debt over assets; the
second is short-term debt over total liabilities. The legal and institutional factors accounted
for here are again judiciary system (an indicator of the functioning of the judiciary ranging
from 1 to 4, where lowest is best), and the presence of corruption to influence financing
(using an indication of the corruption of bank officials and ranging from 1 to 4, with lowest is
best). Furthermore, we also control for the importance of intangibles (as measured by the
ratio of intangibles over total assets) and/or for the relative importance of capital expenditures
(as a share in total assets). Again, we also account for the specific position of the ICT sector
(the ICT dummy, or alternatively by including the ICT sector-specific effect of these different
barriers through multiplying the barrier variable wit the ICT secor dummy variable) and for
firm size. The estimated equations are the following:
Ltdebt/assets (or, alternatively STdebt/liabilities) = a + b1 ICT (or alternatively
barrieri*ICT) + b2 Judiciary (or alternatively Collateral) + b3 Intangibles/total assets
(or alternatively capital expenditures/total assets) + b4 Size + b5,n Country dummies + e.8
5.1.3 The impact of constraints on firm growth
Finally, we test for the influence of these legal, institutional and ICT barriers on firm growth.
We account for the efficiciency of ICT laws, the collateral requirements, the presence of
corruption, the overall quality of the judiciary system. Again, we also control for the
importance of intangibles (as measured by the ratio of intangibles over total assets) and/or for
the relative importance of capital expenditures (as a share in total assets), and account for the
ICT dummy effects and for firm size separately. The estimated equation is the following:
Firm growth = a + b1 ICT (or alternatively barrieri*ICT) + b2 Judiciary (or alternatively
ICT Laws, Corruption or Collateral) + b3 Intangibles/total assets + b4 Capital
expenditures/total assets + b5 Size + b6,n Country dummies + e.
Firm growth is expressed as the average percentage real change in firm sales over three years
(1996-98); real growth figures use PPI data.
5.2 Data description
Data are assembled from a variety of sources. Most of the data on institutional and legal
barriers (the variables Collateral, Corruption, Judiciary) are obtained from the WBES
database. The WBES is a recent database, developed by the World Bank, incorporating a
large sample of firm-level survey type data for 81 countries, many of which are developing
countries. They are qualitative data providing subjective information on the extent to which
entrepreneurs perceive different institutional and legal aspects as being problematic to the
development of their business. Country averages are used in the regressions. A detailed
description of the variables is given in Table 1. Data with respect to the efficacity of ICT laws
come from the World Economic Forum’s Global Competitivesness Report (2001-2). Table 6
provides information on the correlation of the variables used in the empirical analysis.
Firm-level data on intangible assets, debt, and firm growth are WorldScope (WorldScope
CD-Rom 1999), as used also by Claessens and Laeven (2001). WorldScope provides firm-
level accounting data for a sample of listed companies-only for a set of 51 countries. Data
used in the regression are for 1998, except for data on sales, for which we use the 1996-98
period to construct average growth rates. Matching both datasets and selecting only firms
with three years of data (to construct the average growth variable) provides a dataset of
relevant firm-level data for 2888 firms in 25 countries.6
5.3 Empirical results
In this section we present the results of the regression models of the previous section 5.1. We
start with the discussion of the results of the impact of legal, institutional and ICT barriers on
the presence of intangible assets, which is important for new economy firms, as shown in
Table 7.
                                                
6  Argentina, Brazil, Canada, Chile, China, Colombia, Czech Republic, France, Hungary, India, Indonesia,
Malaysia, Mexico, Pakistan, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Russia, Singapore, Slovakia, Sweden,
Thailand, US and Venezuela.9
Table 7 reports our univariate and multivariate regressions to test for the impact of legal and
institutional constraints on investments in intangible assets, measured as the amount of
intangible assets over total assets. As dependent variables we test for the impact of collateral
(column [1] of panel A), corruption of bank officials (column [1] of panel B), the functioning
of the judiciary (general legal constraint; column [1] of panel C), and the overall efficacy of
laws relating to the ICT sector, such as e-commerce and digital signatures (column [1] of
panel D).7 We find that each of the constraints is highly significant, indicating that legal and
institutional constraints have an important impact on the asset structure of companies. The
variable collateral has a negative sign and is very significant, indicating that stringent
requirements on collateral indeed depress the use of intangibles. This is not surprisingly as
only tangible assets can serve as collateral. Furthermore, more legal constraints as proxied by
JUDS show a negative impact on the fraction of intangible assets as well. This is in line with
Claessens and Laeven (2001) who report an asset-substitution effect in case of lower
protection of property rights. Next, the variable indicating the quality of ICT laws is positive
and very significant: high (poor) quality of ICT laws leads to an increased (depressed) use of
intangibles (as a share of total assets). To test for robustness, we include sector (column [2])
and country dummies (column [4]). The above results remain the same. As could be expected
ICT companies tend to have a higher fraction of intangible assets, but, more importantly, the
legal and institutional constraints are more problematic for ICT companies (columns [3] and
[6]). Finally, we also include size as dependent variable as it was reported as an important
variable in Beck, Demirgüç-Kunt and Maksimovic (2002). Larger companies tend to have
slightly more intangible assets.
Tables 8 and 9 test to what extent the financial structure of companies is influenced by
institutional, legal and ICT constraints. First, Table 8 tests for a long-term debt financing
effect (measured as the amount of long-term debt over total assets). Do legal and institutional
barriers effect the availability of long-term debt? From panel A, we can see that legal
constraints, as proxied by JUDS, have a huge negative impact on the amount of long-term
debt. Moreover, again size does matter: larger firms tend to be able to attract relatively more
long-term financing, a result that is  well-known from other studies. We also control for
investment-intensity: higher capital expenditures (as a percentage of assets) lead to a higher
degree of long-term financing.
Again, we include sector and country dummies to check for robustness and find similar
results. Also, these results confirm that the financing effect is more problematic for ICT
companies (columns [3] and [8]). Alternatively, panel B tests for the impact of the corruption
of bank officials and reports similar results. Corruption has clearly an important impact on
the availability of long-term debt.
Next, in order to check for robustness of the results, Table 9 tests for the use of short-term
debt, measured as the amount of short-term debt over total liabilities. The overall results are
consistent with the former ones on long-term debt. Weaker legal and institutional settings
lead to the more intensive use of short-term debt and also firm size matters: smaller firms
indeed tend to have a higher degree of short-term debt.
Finally we discuss to what extent firm growth is influenced by these institutional, legal and
ICT barriers, as shown in Table 10.  The results presented in this table focus on the
functioning of the judiciary as a proxy for the general legal constraint; but additional results
                                                
7 Correlations shown in Table 6.10
are presented for the overall efficacy of laws relating to the ICT sector (columns [7-8]), as
well as for the impact of collateral (column [9]) and corruption of bank officials (column
[10]).
First of all, the empirical results show  that firms with a higher investment-intensity (as
measured by the ratio of capital expenditures over assets) and a higher degree of intangibles
tend to have significantly higher growth rates. This overall result confirms our hypothesis that
a policy of stimulating investment, and especially investment in intangibles, might be very
important engine for growth. After controlling for these factors, the results show that legal
constraints depress firm growth in a significant way, a result which is robust after checking
with country dummies. In our sample, ICT firms do not seem to have significantly different
growth rates8, nor do legal barriers seem to particularly affect growth rates of ICT firms. As
witnessed from the results of columns [7] and [8], the efficiacy of ICT laws does seem to
have a significant impact of growth rates of all firms, but not particularly of that of ICT firms.
Using other proxies such as related to collateral or corruption tend to confirm these overall
results, as presented in columns [9] and [10] of the table.
6 Conclusions and further research
This paper aimed at determining the obstacles for an appropriate financial architecture of new
economy firms in developing countries by reviewing the theoretical and some preliminary
empirical underpinnings of the importance of legal and institutional barriers. Apart from the
more conventional institutional and legal barriers, which are advanced by the recent law and
finance literature, the analysis in this paper focuses on the importance of the ICT
environment, as a potentially important barrier to the development of the business sector in
general, and new economy firms in particular. This preliminary analysis confirms the
importance of the legal environment in general, and also of the legal environment related to
ICT issues in particular, not only for asset allocation (and the creation of intangibles) and for
the financial structure of firms, but ultimately also for firm growth in developing countries.
As a policy recommendation, further attention should be given to reducing the barriers that
impede the creation of intangibles and to develop a more adequate overall legal framework
and also a ICT-related legal framework for ICT companies in order to bridge the digital
divide between developed and developing countries and to stimulate overall firm growth.
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The variables and sources
Variables Description
Violation of patents Is the violation of your copyrights, patents or trademarks by your competitors:
no obstacle (1), a minor obstacle (2), a moderate obstacle (3) or a major
obstacle (4)?(a
Collateral requirements Are collateral requirements of banks/financial institutions: no obstacle (1), a
minor obstacle (2), a moderate obstacle (3) or a major obstacle (4)?(a
Audited financial statements Does your firm provide its shareholders with annual financial statements that
have been reviewed by an external auditor: yes (1) or no (2)?(a
IAS Does your firm use international accounting standards (IAS): yes (1) or no
(2)?(a
Corruption of bank officials Is the corruption of bank officials: no obstacle (1), a minor obstacle (2), a
moderate obstacle (3) or a major obstacle (4)?(a
Predictability of laws and regulations
The process of developing new rules, regulations or policies is usually such
that business are informed in advance of changes affecting them: (1) always,
(2) mostly, (3) frequently, (4) sometimes, (5) seldom or (6) never.(a
Quality of courts The overall quality of the judiciary/courts is: (1) very good, (2) good, (3) slightly
good, (4) slightly bad, (5) bad or (6) very bad.(a
Courts are fair and impartial In resolving business disputes, do you believe your country’s court system to
be fair and impartial: (1) always, (2) mostly, (3) frequently, (4) sometimes, (5)
seldom or (6) never.(a
Courts are honest and uncorruptedIn resolving business disputes, do you believe your country’s court system to
be honest and uncorrupted: (1) always, (2) mostly, (3) frequently, (4)
sometimes, (5) seldom or (6) never.(a
Courts are consistent In resolving business disputes, do you believe your country’s court system to
be consistent: (1) always, (2) mostly, (3) frequently, (4) sometimes, (5) seldom
or (6) never.(a
Court decisions are enforced In resolving business disputes, do you believe your country’s courts to enforce
decisions: (1) always, (2) mostly, (3) frequently, (4) sometimes, (5) seldom or
(6) never.(a
Confidence in legal system to uphold my rights
I am confident that the legal system will uphold my contract and property rights
in business disputes: (1) fully agree, (2) agree in most cases, (3) tend to agree,
(4) tend to disagree, (5) disagree in most cases or (6) fully disagree.(a
Corruption How problematic is corruption for the operation and growth of your business:
no obstacle (1), a minor obstacle (2), a moderate obstacle (3) or a major
obstacle (4)?(a
Judiciary (legal constraint) How problematic is functioning of the judiciary for the operation and growth of
your business: no obstacle (1), a minor obstacle (2), a moderate obstacle (3) or
a major obstacle (4)?(a
Table 1 continues18
Table 1 (con’t)
The variables and sources
Variables Description
ICT laws It measures the efficacy of laws relating to electronic commerce, digital
signatures, and consumer protection. Ratings range from 1 to 7; the higher the
rating the better. A rating of 1 means the laws are nonexistent; a rating of 7
means that the laws are well developed and enforced.(b
Population The population of the country in millions at the mid of 2000.(a
Telephone mainlines Telephone mainlines are telephone lines connecting a customer’s equipment to
the public switched telephone network (data for the entire country; per 1000
people).(c
Mobile phones  Mobile phones refer to users of portable telephones subscribing to an
automatic public mobile telephone service using cellular technology that
provides access to the public switched telephone network, per 1000 people.(c
Mobiles/mainlines
Personal computers Personal computers per 1000 people are self-contained computers designed to
be used by a single individual.(c
Internet  Internet users are people with access to the worldwide network. Data on
Internet users are based on reported estimates or derived from reported counts
of Internet service provider (ISP) subscribers.(c
Highly-skilled IT job market  It measures the availability of highly skilled technology workers in industry.
Ratings range from 1 to 7; the higher the rating the better. A rating of 1 means
that skilled IT there has been no change; a rating of 7 means large
improvements.(b
Note: This table describes the variables collected for the countries and firms included in this paper. Column
one gives the names of the variables, while column two gives a description and provides the source
from which it was collected.
Sources: (a World Bank (2000);
(b  World Economic Forum (2002);
(c ITU (2000).19
Table 2
Overview of the ICT environment according to region and development status, 2000










































































































per 1000 people per 1000 people
Panel I: Region
Africa 31 29 1.01 14 7 4.18 3.20
Transition Europe & former
USSR
224 132 0.44 77 54 4.08 3.45
Asia 118 125 1.15 64 53 4.44 3.70
Latin America 132 95 0.76 51 43 4.06 3.19
High-income OECD 574 580 1.07 342 284 6.02 5.14
Panel II: Income classification
Low income 41 12 0.82 6 4 3.49 2.91
Lower middle income 127 55 0.56 32 24 3.68 2.99
Upper middle income 238 200 0.93 80 87 4.72 3.73
High income 548 592 1.15 349 274 5.94 5.12
Legend:  (a Rating from 1 to 7, highest is best; income classification as defined by the World Bank; sample of
81 countries included in WBES database
Source: ITU (2000).20
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per 1000 people per 1000 people
Albania 2 39 8 0.21 6 1 na na
Argentina 3 213 163 0.77 51 68 4.10 2.50
Armenia 1 152 5 0.03 7 13 na na
Azerbaijan 1 104 56 0.54 na 2 na na
Bangladesh 1 4 1 0.25 2 1 2.30 2.10
Belarus 2 269 5 0.02 na 18 na na
Belize 2 149 70 0.47 125 63 na na
Bolivia 2 61 70 1.15 17 14 3.20 2.10
Bosnia 2 103 30 0.29 na 5 na na
Botswana 3 93 123 1.32 37 9 na na
Brazil 3 182 136 0.75 44 29 5.40 3.80
Bulgaria 2 350 90 0.26 44 52 2.50 3.00
Cambodia 1 2 10 5.00 1 1 na na
Cameroon 1 6 10 1.67 3 3 na na
Canada 4 677 285 0.42 390 412 5.60 5.50
Chile 3 221 222 1.00 82 167 5.30 3.60
China 2 112 66 0.59 16 18 4.50 3.20
Colombia 2 169 53 0.31 35 21 3.30 3.80
Costa Rica 3 249 52 0.21 149 66 5.30 3.40
Cote d'Ivoire 1 18 30 1.67 6 3 na na
Croatia 3 365 231 0.63 81 57 na na
Czech Rep 3 378 424 1.12 122 97 5.20 4.40
Dominican Rep. 2 105 82 0.78 na 7 4.40 3.20
Ecuador 2 100 38 0.38 22 14 3.20 2.70
Egypt 2 86 21 0.24 22 7 4.80 3.10
El Salvador 2 100 118 1.18 19 8 3.90 3.20
Estonia 3 363 387 1.07 153 280 5.20 4.80
Ethiopia 1 4 0 0.00 1 0 na na
France 4 579 493 0.85 304 144 5.70 5.50
Georgia 1 139 34 0.24 na 5 na na
Germany 4 611 586 0.96 336 292 6.50 5.20
Ghana 1 12 6 0.50 3 2 na na
Guatemala 2 57 61 1.07 11 7 3.80 2.50
Haiti 1 9 3 0.33 na 1 na na
Honduras 2 46 24 0.52 11 6 4.20 2.50
Hungary 3 372 302 0.81 85 148 4.80 3.80
India 1 32 4 0.13 5 5 4.40 4.40
Indonesia 1 31 17 0.55 10 10 4.50 2.70
Italy 4 474 737 1.55 180 229 5.90 4.50
Kazakhstan 2 113 12 0.11 na 7 na na
Kenya 1 10 4 0.40 5 7 na na
Kyrgizstan 1 77 2 0.03 na 11 na na
Table 3 continues21
Table 3 (con’t)






















































































































per 1000 people per 1000 people
Lithuania 2 321 142 0.44 65 61 3.60 3.40
Madagascar 1 3 4 1.33 2 2 na na
Malawi 1 4 5 1.25 1 1 na na
Malaysia 3 199 213 1.07 103 159 4.90 4.80
Mexico 3 125 142 1.14 51 28 4.20 3.10
Moldova 1 133 32 0.24 15 12 na na
Namibia 2 63 47 0.75 34 17 na na
Nicaragua 1 31 18 0.58 9 10 3.20 2.60
Nigeria 1 4 0 0.00 7 2 3.70 2.70
Pakistan 1 22 2 0.09 4 1 na na
Panama 3 151 145 0.96 37 31 4.30 3.70
Peru 2 64 48 0.75 41 97 3.50 3.40
Philippines 2 40 84 2.10 19 26 3.20 4.10
Poland 3 282 174 0.62 69 72 5.30 3.90
Portugal 4 430 665 1.55 299 250 5.40 4.30
Romania 2 175 112 0.64 32 36 2.20 1.90
Russia 2 218 22 0.10 43 21 3.70 2.40
Senegal 1 22 26 1.18 17 4 na na
Singapore 4 484 684 1.41 483 300 6.20 5.80
Slovakia 3 314 205 0.65 137 120 4.80 3.20
Slovenia 4 386 612 1.59 276 150 4.90 4.20
South Africa 3 114 190 1.67 62 56 4.60 4.10
Spain 4 421 609 1.45 143 136 6.00 4.60
Sweden 4 682 717 1.05 507 455 6.10 5.70
Tanzania 1 5 5 1.00 3 3 na na
Thailand 2 92 50 0.54 24 38 4.90 3.30
Trinidad & Tobago 3 231 103 0.45 62 77 4.10 3.70
Tunisia 2 90 6 0.07 23 10 na na
Turkey 3 280 246 0.88 38 31 5.10 2.90
Uganda 1 3 8 2.67 3 2 na na
UK 4 589 727 1.23 338 302 6.30 5.40
Ukraine 1 199 16 0.08 18 6 2.70 3.00
Uruguay 3 278 132 0.47 105 112 3.80 4.00
US 4 700 398 0.57 585 339 6.70 5.60
Uzbekistan 1 67 2 0.03 na 5 na na
Venezuela 3 108 217 2.01 46 39 3.90 3.70
Zambia 1 8 9 1.13 7 2 na na
Zimbabwe 1 18 23 1.28 12 4 3.60 2.90
Legend: (a Rating from 1 to 7, highest is best; na = not available; income level: low income (1), lower middle
income (2), upper middle income (3) and high income (4), as defined by the World Bank; sample of 81
countries included in WBES database.
Source: ITU (2000).Table 4

































1 Africa 1.92 2.52 1.84 1.86 1.81 4.3 3.19 3 3.18 3.48 3.18 3.16 2.83 na 3.2
2 Transition Europe & former USSR 2.49 2.48    1.59 1.68 1.82 4.2 3.77 3.86 4 4.04 3.73 3.53 2.46 2.12 3.45
3 Asia 2.48 2.36 1.39 1.52 2.06 3.64 3.23 3.18 3.38 3.36 3.4 2.83 2.67 2.04 3.7
4 Latin America 2.72 2.79 1.25 1.35 1.68 3.73 3.93 3.97 4.02 4.31 3.89 3.23 2.75 2.38 3.19
5 OECD 1.88 2.11 1.27 1.53 1.26 3.52 3.38 3.31 3.03 3.72 3.33 3.05 1.63 1.77 5.14
Panel II: Income classification
1 Low income 2.28 2.63 1.65 1.7 2.02 4.22 3.58 3.67 3.95 4.05 3.68 3.47 2.89 2.13 2.91
2 Lower middle income 2.61 2.51 1.49 1.6 1.9 3.97 3.56 3.74 3.85 3.93 3.78 3.37 2.72 2.26 2.99
3 Upper middle income 2.44 2.5 1.43 1.51 1.57 3.82 3.67 3.39 3.42 3.76 3.4 2.94 2.36 2.17 3.73
4 High income 1.9 2.13 1.26 1.5 1.26 3.49 3.31 3.11 2.87 3.48 3.09 2.92 1.6 1.79 5.12
Legend: cmpe (violation of patents), coll (collateral), afs (audited financial statements), ias (international accounting standards), corr (corruption of bank officials), law_pred
(predictability of laws and regulations), qcrt (quality of courts), fi_crt (courts are fair and impartial), hu_crt (courts are honest and uncorrupt), cst_crt (courst are
consistent), enf_crt (court decisions are enforced), cf_crt (confidence in legal system to uphold my rights), gcorr (corruption), juds (judiciary). See Table 1 for the precise
definition.
(a rating from 1 to 4 (lowest best);
(b rating from 1 to 2 (lowest best);
(c rating from 1 to 6 (lowest best);
(d rating from 1 to 7 (highest best);
Income classification as defined by the World Bank; sample of 81 countries included in WBES database.
Source:  World Bank and ITU (2000).
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2Table 5
Overview of legal and institutional constraints per country
cmpe coll afs_yn ias_yn corr law_pred qcrt fi_crt hu_crt cst_crt enf_crt cf_crt gcorr juds ICT laws
Country
Albania 3.01 2.37 1.50 1.37 2.11 3.76 3.88 3.66 2.85 4.21 4.58 3.66 3.25 2.61 na
Argentina 2.91 2.71 1.22 1.48 1.52 3.84 4.16 4.33 4.17 4.64 3.91 3.50 2.62 2.33 2.50
Armenia 2.23 1.51 1.82 1.82 1.16 4.13 3.90 4.53 4.71 4.61 3.73 3.43 1.90 1.47 na
Azerbaijan 2.83 2.57 1.92 1.82 2.86 2.94 3.46 3.25 3.67 4.16 3.79 2.84 2.76 2.37 na
Bangladesh 2.64 2.69 1.05 1.24 2.16 3.78 3.30 3.04 3.39 3.70 3.55 2.92 3.50 2.41 2.10
Belarus 1.39 2.27 1.54 1.89 1.26 4.45 3.69 3.88 4.17 3.97 3.43 3.72 1.78 1.50 na
Belize 2.00 2.42 1.36 1.45 1.40 3.14 2.85 2.54 2.85 3.13 3.33 2.25 2.10 1.60 na
Bolivia 3.17 3.19 1.21 1.29 1.63 3.76 4.67 4.71 4.85 4.90 4.47 3.79 3.55 2.72 2.10
Bosnia 3.23 2.34 1.49 1.22 1.56 4.38 3.78 3.48 3.57 4.02 4.16 3.08 2.57 2.47 na
Botswana 1.70 2.26 0.84 0.92 1.21 3.53 2.29 1.82 1.80 2.27 2.18 2.09 1.69 na na
Brazil 2.47 2.91 1.18 1.42 1.28 4.18 4.28 3.77 3.82 4.25 3.39 3.32 2.49 2.54 3.80
Bulgaria 3.13 3.03 1.69 1.80 2.08 3.89 3.34 3.95 4.26 3.96 2.41 3.25 2.59 2.18 3.00
Cambodia na 1.98 1.78 1.74 2.23 3.96 3.87 4.25 4.42 na 3.73 3.28 na 2.00 na
Cameroon 2.18 2.39 0.90 0.94 1.83 4.47 4.06 4.00 4.14 4.22 3.65 3.80 3.39 na na
Canada 1.51 2.10 1.32 1.55 1.07 3.23 2.55 2.72 2.52 3.13 2.72 2.55 1.31 1.43 5.50
Chile 1.87 2.32 1.17 1.33 1.20 3.03 3.53 3.00 2.79 3.30 2.69 2.15 1.87 1.99 3.60
China 2.45 1.80 1.57 1.88 1.99 3.28 3.00 2.92 3.30 3.10 3.07 2.59 2.03 1.56 3.20
Colombia 2.79 2.80 1.12 1.32 1.59 4.16 4.10 3.89 4.16 4.31 4.04 3.17 2.78 2.37 3.80
Costa Rica 2.71 2.88 1.20 1.18 1.77 3.34 3.54 2.94 3.09 3.51 3.55 2.52 2.51 2.13 3.40
Côte d'Ivoire 2.05 2.72 0.89 0.98 2.05 4.27 3.67 3.76 3.95 4.04 3.69 3.68 3.29 na na
Croatia 3.04 2.55 1.09 1.01 1.79 4.02 4.07 3.87 3.97 4.06 3.85 3.04 2.62 2.72 na
Czech Rep 1.98 2.33 1.79 1.85 1.87 3.89 4.13 4.01 4.18 4.08 3.70 3.72 2.14 2.13 4.40
Dominican Rep. 2.88 2.63 1.10 1.31 1.38 3.83 3.45 3.94 3.83 4.23 3.80 3.12 2.94 2.48 3.20
Ecuador 2.81 2.92 1.38 1.46 2.67 4.08 4.28 4.48 4.35 4.75 4.46 3.49 3.54 3.04 2.70
Egypt 2.22 2.46 0.84 0.62 2.31 4.22 2.13 1.87 2.07 2.38 2.40 2.35 3.15 na 3.10
El Salvador 2.97 3.09 1.07 1.49 1.70 3.70 3.86 4.32 4.53 4.54 4.25 3.12 3.03 2.65 3.20
Estonia 2.15 2.28 1.66 1.31 1.35 4.14 3.43 3.06 3.05 3.25 3.09 2.81 1.85 1.70 4.80




Overview of legal and institutional constraints per country
cmpe coll afs_yn ias_yn corr law_pred qcrt fi_crt hu_crt cst_crt enf_crt cf_crt gcorr juds ICT laws
Country
France 1.57 1.91 1.13 1.59 1.28 3.51 3.21 3.44 3.06 3.46 2.54 2.83 1.60 1.73 5.50
Georgia 2.69 2.43 1.57 1.55 2.05 4.35 3.72 4.09 4.18 4.09 3.86 3.27 3.03 1.92 na
Germany 2.47 2.73 1.63 1.48 1.51 3.90 3.46 3.47 3.41 4.17 4.02 3.35 1.84 2.07 5.20
Ghana 1.72 2.38 0.81 0.82 1.99 4.14 2.82 3.17 3.31 3.48 3.10 2.99 2.68 na na
Guatemala 2.54 3.00 1.37 1.45 1.51 3.62 4.31 4.24 4.26 4.56 4.41 3.26 2.62 2.45 2.50
Haiti 2.90 2.75 1.67 1.34 2.02 4.26 4.56 4.75 5.10 5.03 4.75 3.94 3.17 2.29 na
Honduras 2.57 2.76 1.35 1.25 2.03 3.41 3.76 4.09 4.29 4.29 4.22 3.77 2.78 2.26 2.50
Hungary 2.54 2.29 1.41 1.73 1.47 4.04 3.53 3.02 2.82 3.31 3.42 2.74 1.91 1.29 3.80
India 2.05 2.53 1.03 1.25 1.60 3.69 2.96 2.42 2.85 3.32 3.13 2.51 2.80 2.01 4.40
Indonesia 2.47 2.48 1.48 1.55 2.51 4.10 3.93 4.60 4.98 4.73 4.41 3.71 2.63 2.20 2.70
Italy 2.01 2.39 1.31 1.45 1.16 3.80 4.41 3.69 3.51 4.18 3.86 3.63 1.76 2.08 4.50
Kazakhstan 2.46 2.83 1.63 1.37 1.82 4.76 3.80 4.38 4.52 4.42 4.26 3.79 2.50 1.97 na
Kenya 2.07 2.49 0.97 0.88 1.64 4.72 4.25 3.78 4.22 4.42 3.93 4.13 3.46 na na
Kyrgizstan 2.57 3.12 1.67 1.76 2.73 4.20 3.97 4.52 4.55 4.65 4.49 4.10 3.34 2.24 na
Lithuania 2.86 1.82 1.83 1.85 2.18 4.37 3.87 4.19 4.40 4.42 3.49 3.88 2.57 2.19 3.40
Madagascar 2.16 2.69 0.54 0.80 2.31 4.75 4.36 4.34 4.41 4.48 3.99 4.41 3.39 na na
Malawi 1.50 2.98 0.94 0.93 1.37 4.08 3.08 3.07 3.13 3.60 3.63 3.51 2.62 na na
Malaysia 1.65 2.37 1.53 1.80 1.70 3.52 3.05 2.91 3.10 3.26 3.13 2.57 1.85 1.69 4.80
Mexico 2.69 2.82 1.22 1.26 2.04 3.94 3.92 4.17 4.64 4.74 4.32 3.44 3.33 2.84 3.10
Moldova 2.68 2.78 1.58 1.25 2.07 4.32 3.91 4.29 4.58 4.41 4.12 4.04 2.88 2.48 na
Namibia 1.50 2.21 0.97 0.85 1.17 3.34 2.29 1.90 1.84 2.39 2.42 2.43 1.63 na na
Nicaragua 2.98 3.01 1.37 1.48 2.27 3.69 3.89 4.53 4.55 4.52 4.22 3.89 2.87 2.33 2.60
Nigeria 2.08 2.27 0.94 0.91 2.03 5.06 3.19 3.24 3.70 3.83 3.30 3.56 3.40 na 2.70
Pakistan 2.71 3.16 1.48 1.36 2.53 3.44 3.71 3.34 3.38 3.78 3.54 3.16 3.29 2.60 na
Panama 2.89 2.40 1.08 1.20 1.45 3.26 3.52 3.90 3.93 4.15 3.63 2.67 2.86 2.47 3.70
Peru 3.02 2.75 1.21 1.47 2.20 3.37 4.26 4.44 4.68 4.77 4.30 3.72 2.83 2.50 3.40




Overview of legal and institutional constraints per country
cmpe coll afs_yn ias_yn corr law_pred qcrt fi_crt hu_crt cst_crt enf_crt cf_crt gcorr juds ICT laws
Country
Poland 2.55 2.77 1.47 1.77 1.39 3.97 3.76 3.49 3.51 3.73 3.82 2.98 2.21 2.21 3.90
Portugal 1.93 1.55 1.14 1.15 1.47 3.04 3.70 3.38 3.13 3.56 3.52 3.25 1.72 1.76 4.30
Romania 2.58 3.03 1.82 1.73 1.97 4.66 3.63 3.52 3.88 3.80 3.29 3.46 2.83 2.59 1.90
Russia 2.11 2.47 1.57 1.90 1.88 4.64 3.85 4.38 4.55 4.38 4.32 4.25 2.55 2.13 2.40
Senegal 2.47 3.08 0.68 0.68 1.93 4.50 3.00 3.29 3.45 3.61 3.22 2.80 2.94 na na
Singapore 1.41 1.99 1.05 1.32 1.26 2.83 1.79 1.58 1.44 1.83 1.67 1.53 1.25 1.32 5.80
Slovakia 2.31 1.96 1.64 1.91 1.98 4.10 3.74 3.60 3.82 3.90 3.15 3.20 2.38 2.10 3.20
Slovenia 2.56 2.39 1.34 1.43 1.24 3.84 4.00 2.94 2.98 3.12 2.58 3.16 1.63 2.29 4.20
South Africa 1.55 1.86 0.97 0.92 1.11 3.97 2.95 2.10 2.16 2.80 2.71 2.26 2.60 na 4.10
Spain 2.37 1.93 1.29 1.70 1.26 3.60 3.29 3.88 3.53 4.14 3.08 3.02 2.15 2.02 4.60
Sweden 1.70 2.04 1.04 1.18 1.05 3.74 2.91 2.66 2.16 3.09 3.53 2.67 1.18 1.51 5.70
Tanzania 2.05 2.96 0.86 0.88 1.98 4.58 3.55 3.35 3.73 3.84 3.19 3.51 2.93 na na
Thailand 2.89 2.42 1.17 1.38 3.00 3.78 2.85 2.78 2.85 3.03 3.45 2.56 3.47 2.13 3.30
Trinidad & Tobago 2.23 3.01 1.32 1.21 1.76 3.48 2.40 2.70 2.91 3.80 3.40 2.61 1.78 1.42 3.70
Tunisia 2.32 1.75 0.94 0.94 1.14 2.98 2.04 1.94 1.96 2.07 1.85 1.82 2.13 na na
Turkey 2.83 2.32 1.57 1.52 2.34 3.76 4.00 3.23 3.50 3.72 3.33 3.09 2.88 2.29 2.90
Uganda 2.04 2.87 0.84 0.77 2.61 4.64 3.45 3.67 4.09 4.05 3.78 3.52 3.13 na na
UK 1.77 2.21 1.34 1.85 1.03 3.61 3.26 3.09 2.56 3.72 3.24 3.12 1.29 1.55 5.40
Ukraine 2.66 2.84 1.64 1.92 1.94 4.49 3.79 4.23 4.57 4.31 4.00 4.19 2.40 2.05 3.00
Uruguay 2.93 2.33 1.38 1.33 1.13 3.35 3.65 3.49 2.36 3.40 2.72 2.76 2.12 1.92 4.00
US 1.57 2.09 1.34 1.86 1.51 3.22 3.51 3.55 3.53 4.09 3.60 3.09 1.84 1.78 5.60
Uzbekistan 1.66 2.25 1.52 1.86 1.81 3.86 3.20 3.23 3.83 3.45 2.54 2.67 2.24 1.70 na
Venezuela 2.60 2.78 1.07 1.24 1.52 4.44 4.89 4.60 4.78 4.83 4.19 3.65 3.03 2.72 3.70
Zambia 1.82 2.78 0.87 0.93 1.76 4.43 3.10 3.16 3.14 3.78 3.41 3.62 2.76 na na
Zimbabwe 1.75 2.23 0.80 0.90 1.71 4.65 3.00 2.51 2.74 3.41 3.26 2.90 2.86 na 2.90




CAPEX COLL CORR GROWTH ICT ICTLAWS LTDEBT JUDS STDEBT INTANG JUDS*ICT COLL*ICT CORR*ICT ICTLAWS*ICT SIZE
CAPEX 1  1.57E-05 -0.200722  0.065079  0.101732  0.114208  0.191424 -0.071147 -0.232902 -0.069817  0.098601  0.104126  0.085457  0.097658 -0.051586
COLL  1.57E-05 1  0.396153 -0.072810  0.019060 -0.621982  0.008610  0.806911 -0.047166 -0.245422  0.053706  0.049515  0.050798 -0.014449  0.096235
CORR -0.200722  0.396153 1 -0.083279 -0.000810 -0.735351 -0.084677  0.513004  0.129904 -0.186692  0.023719  0.013411  0.071427 -0.031173  0.198839
GROWTH  0.065079 -0.072810 -0.083279 1  0.022944  0.091312  0.029631 -0.060506 -0.025332  0.062469  0.018068  0.019570  0.013797  0.027293 -0.041121
ICTDUM  0.101732  0.019060 -0.000810  0.022944 1  0.000856  0.109781  0.024712 -0.100717  0.156649  0.978408  0.989185  0.939565  0.976379  0.058330
ICTLAWS  0.114208 -0.621982 -0.735351  0.091312  0.000856 1  0.119142 -0.716165 -0.097326  0.272047 -0.032261 -0.021263 -0.046218  0.045331 -0.281858
LTDEBT  0.191424  0.008610 -0.084677  0.029631  0.109781  0.119142 1 -0.057937 -0.898028  0.086469  0.098993  0.110269  0.100992  0.111078  0.080121
JUDS -0.071147  0.806911  0.513004 -0.060506  0.024712 -0.716165 -0.057937 1  0.033548 -0.133716  0.070043  0.050855  0.065953 -0.013157  0.278009
STDEBT -0.232902 -0.047166  0.129904 -0.025332 -0.100717 -0.097326 -0.898028  0.033548 1 -0.083513 -0.092507 -0.103682 -0.088613 -0.100237 -0.061457
INTANG -0.069817 -0.245422 -0.186692  0.062469  0.156649  0.272047  0.086469 -0.133716 -0.083513 1  0.144166  0.144990  0.148177  0.171142  0.068076
JUDS*ICT  0.098601  0.053706  0.023719  0.018068  0.978408 -0.032261  0.098993  0.070043 -0.092507  0.144166 1  0.992425  0.959080  0.920571  0.059135
COLL*ICT  0.104126  0.049515  0.013411  0.019570  0.989185 -0.021263  0.110269  0.050855 -0.103682  0.144990  0.992425 1  0.952480  0.942622  0.055237
CORR*ICT  0.085457  0.050798  0.071427  0.013797  0.939565 -0.046218  0.100992  0.065953 -0.088613  0.148177  0.959080  0.952480 1  0.868037  0.060394
ICTLAWS*ICT  0.097658 -0.014449 -0.031173  0.027293  0.976379  0.045331  0.111078 -0.013157 -0.100237  0.171142  0.920571  0.942622  0.868037 1  0.053224




The impact of constraints on the investment in intangible assets








































Number of firms 2814 2814 2814 2814 2789 2789









































Number of firms 2814 2814 2814 2814 2789 2789









































Number of firms 2814 2814 2814 2814 2789 2789
Adjusted R2 0.01 0.05 0.05 0.14 0.15 0.15








































Number of firms 2807 2807 2807 2807 2782 2782
Adjusted R2 0.05 0.05 0.09 0.14 0.15 0.1528
Notes to Table 7:
The dependent variable is intangible assets/total assets. COLL is an indicator of the collateral requirements
demanded by banks and financial institutions and ranges from 1 to 4 (lowest is best). ICT is a dummy variable
that takes the value 1 if the firm is from the ICT sector and zero if not (based on a two-digit industry code). CORR
is an indicator of indication of the corruption of bank officials and ranges from 1 to 4 (lowest is best). JUDS is an
indicator of the functioning of the judiciary and ranges from 1 to 4 (lowest is best). ICTLAWS is an indicator of the
overall efficacy of laws relating to the ICT sector and ranges from 1 to 7 (highest is best). SIZE is the logarithm of
total assets. The variables COLL and JUDS are obtained from the WBES, ICT and SIZE from WorldScope,
ICTLAWS from World Economic Forum’s Global Competitiveness Report 2001-2. Detailed variable definitions
and sources are given in Table 1. Dataset includes 25 countries (Argentina, Brazil, Canada, Chile, China,
Colombia, Czech Republic, France, Hungary, India, Indonesia, Malaysia, Mexico, Pakistan, Peru, Philippines,
Poland, Portugal, Russia, Singapore, Slovakia, Sweden, Thailand, US, Venezuela). T-statistics are in
parenthesis: *, **, *** indicate significance levels of 10, 5 and 1 percent respectively. Standard errors and
covariance are White heteroskedasticity-consistent.29
Table 8
The impact of constraints on the availability of long-term debt














































































Country dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
Number of firms 2789 2178 2178 2178 2789 2178 2178 2178
Adjusted R














































































Country dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
Number of firms 2789 2178 2178 2178 2789 2178 2178 2178
Adjusted R
2 0.01 0.05 0.05 0.06 0.08 0.15 0.16 0.16
Notes: LT debt/assets is the amount of long-term debt over total assets. ICT is a dummy variable that takes
the value 1 if the firm is from the ICT sector and zero if not (based on a two-digit industry code). CORR
is an indication of the corruption of bank officials and ranges from 1 to 4 (lowest is best). JUDS is an
indicator of the functioning of the judiciary and ranges from 1 to 4 (lowest is best). CAPEX is the ratio of
capital expenditures as a percentage of total assets. SIZE is the logarithm of total assets. The variables
JUDS and CORR are obtained from the WBES; ICT, CAPEX and SIZE from WorldScope. Detailed
variable definitions and sources are given in Table 1. The twenty-five countries included in the dataset
given in Table 7. T-statistics are in parenthesis: *, **, *** indicate significance levels of 10, 5 and 1 per
cent respectively. Standard errors and covariance are White heteroskedasticity-consistent.30
Table 9
The impact of constraints on the availability of short-term debt






























































Country dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
No. of firms 2885 2840 2840 2840 2840 2840 2840 2840
Adjusted R






























































Country dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
No. of firms 2885 2840 2840 2840 2840 2840 2840 2840
Adjusted R
2 0.01 0.02 0.03 0.03 0.11 0.12 0.12 0.12
Notes: The dependent variable is the amount of short-term debt over total liabilities. ICT is a dummy variable
that takes the value 1 if the firm is from the ICT sector and zero if not (based on a two-digit industry
code). CORR is an indication of the corruption of bank officials and ranges from 1 to 4 (lowest is best).
JUDS is an indicator of the functioning of the judiciary and ranges from 1 to 4 (lowest is best). INTANG
is the ratio of intangible assets over total assets. SIZE is the logarithm of total assets. The variables
JUDS and CORR are obtained from the WBES; ICT, INTANG and SIZE from WorldScope. Detailed
variable definitions and sources are given in Table 1. The twenty-five countries included in the dataset
given in Table 7. T-statistics are in parenthesis: *, **, *** indicate significance levels of 10, 5 and 1 per
cent, respectively. Standard errors and covariance are White heteroskedasticity-consistent.Table 10
The impact of constraints on the real growth of firms













































































Country dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Number of firms 2211 2211 2211 2180 2211 2180 2205 2174 2180 2180
Adjusted R
2 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01
Notes: The dependent variable is the 3-year average real growth of sales (period 1996-98), in percentage points. ICT is a dummy variable that takes the value 1 if the firm is from
the ICT sector and zero if not (based on a two-digit industry code). COLL is an indicator of the collateral requirements demanded by banks and financial institutions and
ranges from 1 to 4 (lowest is best). CORR is an indicator of indication of the corruption of bank officials and ranges from 1 to 4 (lowest is best). JUDS is an indicator of the
functioning of the judiciary and ranges from 1 to 4 (lowest is best). ICTLAWS is an indicator of the overall efficacy of laws relating to the ICT sector and ranges from 1 to 7
(highest is best). SIZE is the logarithm of total assets. CAPEX is the ratio of capital expenditures as a percentage of total assets. ). INTANG is the ratio of intangible assets
over total assets. The variables COLL and JUDS are obtained from the WBES, ICT and SIZE from WorldScope, ICTLAWS from World Economic Forum’s Global
Competitiveness Report 2001-02. CORR is an indication of the corruption of bank officials and ranges from 1 to 4 (lowest is best). JUDS is an indicator of the functioning of
the judiciary and ranges from 1 to 4 (lowest is best). SIZE is the logarithm of total assets. The variables JUDS and CORR are obtained from the WBES; ICT, INTANG,
CAPEX and SIZE from WorldScope. Detailed variable definitions, and sources are given in Table 1. The twenty-five countries included in the dataset given in Table 7. T-
statistics are in parenthesis:  *, **, *** indicate significance levels of 10, 5 and 1 per cent, respectively. Standard errors and covariance are White
heteroskedasticity-consistent.
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